Peace and Conflict Analysis for International Development: The Logic of Asymmetric Survival: Vietnam's Hedging Behaviour in China–Vietnam Relations through a Game-Theoretic Perspective
Keywords:
Vietnam; hedging; cooperative game theory; non-cooperative games; China– U.S. rivalry; strategic autonomy; ASEAN; great-power politics; foreign policy; security strategy.Abstract
This paper develops a strategic game-theoretic model to explain Vietnam’s hedging behaviour amid intensifying China–U.S. great power competition. Existing studies often describe Vietnam’s hedging qualitatively but lack a formal framework that clarifies when cooperation with China is sustainable and why different levels of hedging produce divergent strategic outcomes. This paper fills this gap by constructing a unified symbolic payoff matrix and transferrable-utility cooperative game model to show how Vietnam’s hedging directly shapes outside options, bargaining power, and the conditions under which cooperation becomes unstable. The analysis demonstrates that moderate hedging increases Vietnam’s outside option without eliminating the cooperative surplus, making it the only strategy capable of sustaining autonomy while preserving cooperation. Scenario analysis—no hedging, strong hedging, and moderate hedging—further illustrates how inappropriate hedging levels can shift the cooperative game into a non-cooperative one, either by inviting dependence on China or provoking counter-pressure and heightened U.S. involvement. Policy implications highlight that Vietnam must maintain a calibrated hedging posture, strengthen diversified partnerships without alliance entanglements, and preserve domestic legitimacy to avoid destabilising dynamics. The findings enhance theoretical understanding of small-state strategies and offer practical guidance for sustaining a stable cooperative equilibrium in South-east Asia.
References
[1]Babaev, K. V. (2023). Problems and prospects of contemporary Vietnam–China relations. The Russian Journal of Vietnamese Studies. Eco-Vector.
[2]Barron, E. N. (2024). Game Theory: An Introduction. Springer. Retrieved from https://books.google.com
[3]Cuong, N. M., Chelabi, K., Anjum, S., Sateeshchandra, N. G., Samoylenko, S., Silwizya, K., & Nghiem, T. (2024). US–China global competition and dilemma for
Vietnam’s strategic choices in the South China Sea conflict. Heritage and Sustainable Development, 6(1), 349–364.
[4]Do, T. T. (2022). Vietnam’s growing agency in the twenty-first century. The Pacific Review. Taylor & Francis.
[5]Downs, G., & Rocke, D. M. (2021). Optimal Imperfection?: Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations. Torrossa.
[6]Dung, P. X. (2022). “No one can force Vietnam to choose sides”: Vietnam as a self-reliant middle power. Asia Policy. Johns Hopkins University Press.
[7]Dung, P. X., & Ho, B. T. E. (2025). How regime legitimation influences Vietnam’s strategy toward US–China strategic rivalry. International Journal of Asian Studies. Cambridge University Press.
[8]Hung, V. M., Binh, N. T., & Hiep, T. X. (2025). The India–Vietnam–China geopolitical triangle and Vietnam’s measures to navigate this relationship from a twolevel game theory perspective. Multidisciplinary Reviews. Retrieved from https:
//malque.pub
[9]Johnson, T., & Heiss, A. (2023). Liberal institutionalism. In International Organization and Global Governance. Taylor & Francis.
[10]Jütersonke, O. (2006). Morgenthau and the return to ethics in a realist theory of power politics. Cooperation and Conflict, 41(3), 251–272. https://doi.org/10. 1177/0010836706066544
[11]Kirshner, J. (2023). Review – An Unwritten Future. e-International Relations. Retrieved from https://www.e-ir.info
[12]Kuik, C. C. (2021). Getting hedging right: A small-state perspective. China International Strategy Review. Springer.
[13]Liu, Q. (2024). Comparison of hedging strategies between Vietnam and the Philippines amid the US–China strategic competition. International Journal of Strategic Studies and Management. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org
[14]Lynch, T. J. (2009). Liberalism and neoliberalism. In New Directions in U.S. Foreign Policy. Taylor & Francis.
[15]MacMillan, J. (2007). Liberal internationalism. In International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century. Taylor & Francis.
[16]Marston, H. S. (2024). Navigating great power competition: A neoclassical realist view of hedging. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. Oxford Academic.
[17]Marwala, T. (2023). Artificial Intelligence, Game Theory and Mechanism Design in
Politics. Springer. Retrieved from https://books.google.com
[18]Marwala, T. (2023). Game theory in politics. In Artificial Intelligence, Game Theory and Mechanism Design in Politics. Springer.
[19]Meirowitz, A., & Ramsay, K. W. (2020). Applied game theory: An overview and first thoughts on the use of game theoretic tools. In The SAGE Handbook of Research Methods. SAGE Publications.
[20]Moravcsik, A. (1992). Liberalism and international relations theory. Princeton University. Retrieved from https://www.princeton.edu
[21]Moravcsik, A. (2010). Liberal theories of international relations: A primer. Princeton University. Retrieved from https://www.princeton.edu
[22]Ngan, V. T. T. (2023). A two-level game approach to Hanoi’s foreign policy proactivism. Asian Perspective. Johns Hopkins University Press.
[23]Nguyen Manh Cuong, Mutai, N. C., & Aminpour, N. (2025). Conflict and sustainable development: The case of conflict and alliance between Russia and China for global peace and sustainable development in the era of artificial intelligence and digital revolution. Scientific Journal of Business and Innovation, 5(1). Available at: https:// indd.adobe.com/view/c8fff891-ab9a-4de4-a64e-66e5d8b0663e (Accessed: 29 September 2025).
[24]Nguyen, M. C., Chelabi, K., Anjum, S., Kumari, S., Samoylenko, S., Silwizya, K., & Nghiem, T. (2024). Mindfulness approach and the redefined analysis model of conflict: The case study of the Ukraine conflict. Social Sciences, 13(11), 564. (Q2, Scopus and SCI).
[25]Nguyen-Vo, T. (2024). Geoeconomic and foreign policy implications of Vietnam’s economic dependency on China. Fulbright Review of Economics and Policy. Emerald Publishing.
[26]Onuf, N. (2012). World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations. Routledge. (Original work published 1989.)
[27]Powell, R. (2020). In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics. De Gruyter Brill.
[28]Rahman, M. M. (2021). Review of Neo-Classical Realism and its assessment of independent and intervening variables in foreign policy analysis. International Journal of Politics and Security. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr
[29]Ross, R. S. (2021). China–Vietnamese relations in the era of rising China: Power, resistance, and maritime conflict. Journal of Contemporary China. Taylor & Francis. [30] Vuving, A. L. (2023). The evolution of Vietnamese foreign policy in the Doi Moi era.
In Vietnam: Navigating a Rapidly Changing Economy. Brill.
[31]Weiss, U., & Agassi, J. (2023). Game theory for international accords. In Games to Play and Games Not to Play: Strategic Choices in Politics. Springer.
[32]Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press.
[33]Wu, X., & Velasco, J. C. (2024). Navigating the Indo-Pacific: Vietnam’s hedging strategies amid the geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States. Asian Perspective. Johns Hopkins University Press.
[34]Xu, Y. (2025). The strategic choices of secondary states: The Philippines and Vietnam under the shadow of US–China rivalry. African and Asian Studies. Brill.
[35]Yoder, B. K., & Haynes, K. (2021). Signaling under the security dilemma: An experimental analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 65(7–8), 1247–1275. Retrieved from https://journals.sagepub.com
[36]Zehfuss, M. (2015). Constructivisms in international relations: Wendt, Onuf, and
Kratochwil. In M. Zehfuss, Constructing International Relations: The Next Generation (pp. xx–xx). Routledge.
